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A  P O D C A S T  O F  O N E ’ S  O W N
eah . itman, elissa urray & atherine haw*
Abstract
In this short Essay, we discuss the lack of racial and gender diver-
sity on and around the Supreme Court. As we note, the ranks of 
the Court’s Justices and its clerks historically have been dominat-
ed by white men. But this homogeneity is not limited to the 
Court’s members or its clerks. As we explain, much of the Court’s
broader ecosystem suffers from this same lack of diversity. The 
advocates who argue before the Court are primarily white men; 
the experts cited in the Court’s opinions, as well as the experts on 
whom Court commentators rely in interpreting those opinions, 
are often white men; and the commentators who translate the 
Court’s work for the public are also largely white men. We sug-
gest this lack of diversity has consequences both for the Court’s
work and for the public’s understanding of the Court. We also 
identify some of the factors that contribute to the lack of diversity 
in the Court’s ecosystem, including unduly narrow conceptions of 
expertise and a rigid insistence on particular notions of neutrali-
ty. We also note and discuss our own modest efforts to disrupt 
these dynamics with Strict Scrutiny, our podcast about the Su-
preme Court and the legal culture that surrounds it. To be sure, 
a podcast, by itself, will not dismantle the institutional factors 
that we have identified in this Essay. Nevertheless, we maintain 
that our efforts to use the podcast as a platform for surfacing these 
institutional dynamics, while simultaneously cultivating a more 
diverse cadre of Supreme Court experts and commentators, is a 
step in the right direction.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan, School of Law; Frederick I. and 
Grace Stokes Professor of Law, New York University, School of Law; Professor of 
Law, Cardozo Law School. Laura Miller (Michigan Law, class of 2023) and Alon 
Handler (NYU Law, class of 2022) provided helpful research assistance. All errors are 
our own.
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Introduction
The February 2019 State of the Union featured an arresting visual 
of the changing face of representation in the federal government. On 
the heels of an historic midterm election that sent 102 women to the 
House of Representatives and twenty-five women to the Senate,1 wom-
en from both sides of the aisle arrived at the Capitol outfitted in white, 
in honor of the suffrage movement that secured women’s right to vote 
in 1920. In the sea of white clothing there were a number of faces of 
color, reflecting not just a shift in Congress’s gender makeup, but in its 
racial and ethnic diversity as well.2
But if the halls of Congress are becoming more diverse, the situa-
tion across the street from the Capitol is decidedly different. The Su-
preme Court has long been understood as a countermajoritarian institu-
tion,3 with a degree of insulation from the political process. But its 
composition is also out of sync with the broader contours of the elec-
torate. As currently constituted, the Court is overwhelmingly male, 
Catholic, and white. And if the Court is notably lacking in diversity, the 
ecosystem that surrounds it is even more so. Supreme Court clerks are 
1. Deena Zaru, Why Republican Women Face a Bleaker Picture in the Battle for Represen-
tation in Congress, ABC NEWS (Oct. 14, 2020), https://abcnews.go.com/GMA/News
/republican-women-face-bleaker-picture-battle-representation-congress
/story?id=73560569 [https://perma.cc/9UMG-8CEV] The 116th Congress, which 
began in January 2019, represented “the most diverse group of lawmakers in U.S. 
history.” Id.
2. See id. (noting that of the 127 women in Congress in 2019, forty-seven were women 
of color, and that a record number of women of color won Congressional primaries 
in 2020).
3. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962) (describing the “countermajoritarian dif-
ficulty”).
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largely male and white, hailing from a handful of elite law schools. 
Those who practice before the Court are also a relatively homogenous 
group, as is the pundit class and commentariat that covers the Court 
and translates its doings for the general public.
The homogeneity that surrounds the Court is not simply concern-
ing. It has real costs both for how the Court does its work, and for how 
the general public understands that work.
This Essay proceeds in three parts. Part I elaborates on the homo-
geneity in the Court’s ecosystem. Part II considers the implications of 
this homogeneity for the Court’s jurisprudence and for discussions of 
the Court and its work. Part III then pivots to consider efforts to ad-
dress these dynamics. We discuss our decision to launch a podcast that 
provides commentary on the Supreme Court and the legal culture that 
surrounds it, as well as some of the responses to our decision to do so.
I. Homogeneity and the Supreme Court, by the Numbers
In the history of the United States, 115 Justices have served on the 
Supreme Court. Of these 115 Justices, 108 (93.9%) have been white 
men. Indeed, there have been only five women Justices (4.3%) and 
three Justices of color (2.6%).4 Of the three Justices of color, only one is 
a woman.5 All seventeen of the Court’s Chief Justices have been white 
men.6 The ranks of those who work most closely with the Justices—the 
clerks—reflect a similar lack of diversity. In 2017, Supreme Court cor-
respondent Tony Mauro conducted a survey of Supreme Court clerks, 
finding that between 2005 and 2017, 85% of the 487 clerks hired at the 
Supreme Court were white.7 During this period, only twenty of the 
4. Jessica Campisi & Brandon Griggs, Of the 114 Supreme Court Justices in US History, 
All But 6 Have Been White Men, CNN (Sept. 26, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020
/09/25/politics/supreme-court-justice-minorities-history-trnd/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/59QW-RYAU].
5. Justice Sonia Sotomayor, the first Latina Justice, was appointed to the Court in 2009. 
Charlie Savage, Sotomayor Confirmed by Senate, 68-31, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2009), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/07/us/politics/07confirm.html [https://perma.cc
/ZU6W-Q6ZV].
6. See Campisi & Griggs, supra note 4.
7. Tony Mauro, Mostly White and Male: Diversity Still Lags Among SCOTUS Law 
Clerks, NAT’L L.J. (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/sites
/nationallawjournal/2017/12/11/mostly-white-and-male-diversity-still-lags-among-
scotus-law-clerks/ [https://perma.cc/L929-EANW].
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clerks hired were Black (4.1%).8 Roughly one-third of the clerks were 
women.9
When it comes to the Justices, the demographic data are largely 
unsurprising. After all, for much of the Court’s—and the country’s—
history, the legal profession was one in which white men predominated. 
With the rise of part-time law schools in the postbellum period, the pro-
fession underwent a kind of tentative democratization as part-time law 
schools often catered to the working class and immigrants.10 But these 
fledgling outfits were hardly the proving ground for Supreme Court Jus-
tices, the ranks of whom were, then as now, more often composed of 
the products of elite networks and elite education.11
If racial and gender diversity on the Court have increased in recent 
decades, diversity in educational background has actually decreased; 
even against an elite baseline in which many members of the Court have 
attended Ivy League institutions, as well as other well-regarded schools,12
the current Court is notable in the near-ubiquity of elite credentials. 
Among the current members of the Court, all but two Justices complet-
ed their undergraduate education at Stanford or an Ivy League school 
(Justices Thomas and Barrett attended the College of the Holy Cross 
and Rhodes College, respectively), and all but one received a law degree 
from Yale Law School or Harvard Law School (Justice Barrett attended 
Notre Dame Law School).13
8. Id.
9. Id. The report does not indicate how many clerks were women of color.
10. Melissa Murray, Afterword to HERMA HILL KAY, PAVING THE WAY: THE FIRST 
AMERICAN WOMEN LAW PROFESSORS 295, 298 (2021).
11. Although “the first year when every Justice had four years of undergraduate work and 
three years of law school was 1986, when Justice Scalia replaced Chief Justice Burg-
er,” a number of Justices on earlier courts held degrees from elite institutions. Benja-
min H. Barton, An Empirical Study of Supreme Court Justice Pre-Appointment Experi-
ence, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1137, 1168-69 (2012). For example, the Taney Court “featured 
Harvard alumnus Justice Joseph Story, Princeton (then called the College of New 
Jersey) alumni Justices Smith Thompson and James Wayne, and Yale alumnus Jus-
tice Henry Baldwin.” Id. at 1170 n.100.
12. See Ilana Kowarski, Where Supreme Court Justices Earned Law Degrees, U.S. NEWS
(Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/top-law-
schools/articles/where-supreme-court-justices-earned-law-degrees [https://perma.cc
/8A68-GZ9W] (“Among the 60 justices who were appointed in the 20th and 21st 
centuries, 38 received law degrees from law schools that are ranked among the top 25 
in the 2021 Best Law Schools rankings.”).
13. See id.; see also Valerie Strauss, The ‘Cloistered’ Harvard-Yale Monopoly on the Supreme 
Court, WASH. POST (July 10, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-
sheet/wp/2018/07/10/the-cloistered-harvard-yale-law-monopoly-on-the-supreme-
court/ [https://perma.cc/3XCX-ZG9U].
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The persistent homogeneity of the clerk pool is in some ways more 
surprising, particularly given the demographic changes that have oc-
curred at law schools over the last twenty years. Today, most law schools 
boast diverse student bodies, with women comprising roughly half of 
law school graduates.14 Yet the pool of Supreme Court clerks remains 
overwhelmingly white and male.15
To be sure, some Justices have done a better job of diversifying 
their chambers.16 As of 2017, 31% of Justice Sotomayor’s clerks had 
been racial minorities—the highest percentage among the Justices.17
And in October Term 2018, his first on the Court, Justice Kavanaugh 
boasted the first all-women complement of clerks.18 Indeed, due in part 
to Justice Kavanaugh’s clerk class, the 2018 Term was the first time that 
a majority of Supreme Court clerks were women—twenty-one of the 
forty-one clerks (51.2%).19 The 2018 Term also saw the first Native 
American clerk, in Justice Gorsuch’s chambers.20 And many of the Jus-
tices have looked beyond the halls of traditionally elite law schools in 
their search for new clerks.21
14. See Abigail Rowe, The Parity Paradox, BEST LAWYERS (June 25, 2018), 
https://www.bestlawyers.com/article/women-now-outnumber-men-in-law-
school/2029 [https://perma.cc/DCG5-85RW].
15. See Mauro, supra note 7.
16. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Supreme Court Law Clerks Still Mostly White Men: Which 
Justices Had the Most Diverse Clerks?, A.B.A. J. (Dec. 12, 2017), 
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/supreme_court_law_clerks_are_still_mostly
_white_men_which_justices_had_the [https://perma.cc/3NQS-FZTN].
17. Mauro, supra note 7.
18. Then-Judge Kavanaugh made much of this fact during his Supreme Court confirma-
tion hearings: In the same speech in which he called Dr. Christine Blasey Ford’s sex-
ual assault allegations “a calculated and orchestrated political hit . . . on behalf of the 
Clintons” and warned the Democratic members of the committee, “[y]ou sowed the 
wind. For decades to come I fear the whole country will reap the whirlwind,” he also 
informed the Senate that “if confirmed, I’ll be the first justice in the history of the 
Supreme Court to have a group of all-women law clerks.” Trish Turner & Meghan 
Keneally, ‘You’ll Never Get Me to Quit’: Read Brett Kavanaugh’s Defiant Opening 
Statement, ABC NEWS (Sept. 28, 2018), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/read-
kavanaughs-opening-statement-effort-destroy-good-drive/story?id=58096427 
[https://perma.cc/S4WQ-6ZTK].
19. Erin Coe & Jacqueline Bell, A High Court Milestone Stirs Hope of Gender Parity,
LAW360 (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1093264/a-high-court-
milestone-stirs-hope-of-gender-parity [https://perma.cc/C678-8335].
20. Tony Mauro, Gorsuch Hires Native American Law Clerk, Likely First in SCOTUS His-
tory, NAT’L L.J. (April 14, 2018), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2018/04
/14/gorsuch-hires-native-american-law-clerk-likely-first-in-scotus-history/
[https://perma.cc/U9WD-WT6H].
21. For example, the first group of law clerks hired by the Court’s newest member, Jus-
tice Amy Coney Barrett, includes graduates of the Northwestern University Pritzker 
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Despite these bright spots, however, racial and gender diversity 
among the clerks at the high Court remains elusive. Although Mauro 
reported modest improvement in clerkship diversity between 1998, 
when he first conducted the informal study, and 2005, he also noted 
that Justices Ginsburg and Alito had each only hired one Black clerk 
during the same time period.22 And while the 2018 Term was a high-
water mark for women’s representation in the clerk ranks, in the 2019 
Term the number of women clerks decreased to sixteen (41% of the to-
tal class) and remained at sixteen for the 2020 Term.23
Part of the problem may be the small pool from which the Justices 
select their clerks. Although law clerk hiring is no longer completely 
outsourced to law professors or law school deans, as it once was,24 such 
gatekeepers continue to play important roles in law clerk hiring deci-
sions.25 An equally important stepping stone is a clerkship with a “feed-
er” judge, a lower federal court judge (or occasionally a state supreme 
court justice) whom the Justices trust and respect. And the pool of so-
called feeder judges also reflects a startling homogeneity. From 1970 to 
2014, the top ten feeder judges were all men, and, with the exception of 
one, they were all white.26 Over those forty-four years, this group of ten 
judges sent 392 clerks to the Supreme Court.27 Although there were no-
table women judges who “fed” clerks to the Court, none did so with the 
kind of frequency of the all-men top ten.28 Indeed, from 1970 to 2014, 
School of Law, the University of Chicago Law School, and George Washington Law 
School. See David Lat, Supreme Court Clerk Hiring Watch: Meet Justice Amy Coney 
Barrett’s Clerks (Nov. 3, 2020), https://abovethelaw.com/2020/11/supreme-court-
clerk-hiring-watch-meet-justice-amy-coney-barretts-clerks/ [https://perma.cc/N5D5-
QQ29].
22. Mauro, supra note 7.
23. Id.
24. As Judge Richard Posner described the selection process in the 1960s, when he was 
chosen to serve as a law clerk, “There weren’t many applications; there were no par-
ticular standards. Often the justice would delegate the selection of his law clerks to a 
personal friend, a professional acquaintance, or a law professor he was friendly with, 
without bothering to screen or interview applicants himself.” Richard A. Posner, The
Supreme Court and Celebrity Culture, 88 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 299, 301 (2013).
25. See Leah M. Litman & Deeva Shah, On Sexual Harassment in the Judiciary, 115 NW.
U. L. REV. 599, 626-28 (2020).
26. Alexandra G. Hess, The Collapse of the House That Ruth Built: The Impact of the Feed-
er System on Female Judges and the Federal Judiciary, 1970-2014, 24 J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 61, 80 (2015).
27. Id. at 81.
28. Id.
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the top ten women feeder judges sent only ninety-one clerks in total to 
the Court.29
This disparity shows no signs of abating. In the past three Terms, 
men continued to dominate the ranks of feeder judges. Of the twenty-
four judges who have “fed” at least two clerks to the Supreme Court in a 
single Term, only two of them, Judge Debra Livingston (Second Cir-
cuit) and Judge Dabney Friedrich (District Court for District of Co-
lumbia), are women (8.3%) and just three are racial minorities 
(12.5%).30 No women judges of color sent multiple clerks to the Su-
preme Court in any of the last three Terms.31
To the extent that the ranks of feeder judges are only as diverse as 
the judiciary itself, the recent wave of Trump appointees is unlikely to 
disrupt the homogeneity of the feeder judge pool. As of January 2021, 
only 24% of President Trump’s judicial appointees were women, com-
pared to 45% for President Obama by the end of his first term.32 The 
racial demographics are even starker: A full 84% of President Trump’s 
judicial nominees have been white, compared to 64% of President 
Obama’s nominees during the first four years of his presidency.33
This homogeneity is evident throughout the Court’s ecosystem, 
not just in the ranks of the feeder judges and clerks. Those who argue 
before the Court, as well as those who comment on the Court and 
translate its doings for the larger world are also a relatively homogenous 
group. During the 2019 Term, there were 155 oral argument appear-
29. Of this group of women feeder judges, then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg “fed” seven-
teen clerks to the Court. Id. Her feeder status came to an abrupt conclusion in 1993 
when she was appointed to the Court. The runner up, Judge Patricia Wald, sent six-
teen clerks to the Court between 1970 and 2014. Id. By contrast, during the same 
period, 1970 to 2014, the top male feeder judge, then-Judge Alex Kozinski, sent fif-
ty-eight clerks to the Court, followed by Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson, who sent fifty-
five clerks to the Court. Id. at 80.
30. Feeder Judges, SCOTUS Race & Gender Statistics (last updated November 2020)
(unpublished dataset) (on file with authors).
31. Id.
32. John Gramlich, How Trump Compares with Other Recent Presidents When Appointing 
Federal Judges, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 13, 2021) [hereinafter Gramlich, 2021],
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/01/13/how-trump-compares-with-
other-recent-presidents-in-appointing-federal-judges/ [https://perma.cc/2LZW-
E9Q6]; John Gramlich, How Trump Compares with Other Recent Presidents When 




33. Gramlich, 2021, supra note 32; Gramlich, 2020, supra note 32.
58 michigan  jo urn al  o f  g ender & la w [Vol. 28:51
ances made by 103 advocates.34 Of those 155 appearances, only twenty 
(12.9%) were made by women, and twenty-seven (17.4%) were by ad-
vocates of color.35
But even these numbers obscure the limited pool from which Su-
preme Court advocates are drawn. Three attorneys account for nine of 
the twenty appearances by women advocates: Lisa Blatt for private par-
ties, and Erica Ross and Morgan Ratner for the Office of the Solicitor 
General.36 Fourteen, or just more than half, of the appearances by advo-
cates of color were made on behalf of the Office of the Solicitor Gen-
eral, including seven appearances by the Solicitor General, Noel J. Fran-
cisco.37 In the entire 2019 Term, only one woman of color, Jessica E. 
Méndez-Colberg, made an appearance before the Court, arguing on be-
half of Unión de Trabajadores de la Industria Eléctrica y Riego, Inc. in 
Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius 
Investment.38
The Supreme Court bar is also narrow in terms of bar members’
credentials. In the last five Terms, a small number of elite law schools 
have been responsible for a disproportionate number of Supreme Court 
advocates.39 Specifically, over half of the Supreme Court appearances 
made in the past five terms were by advocates trained at just four law 
schools—Harvard, Yale, Chicago, and Stanford.40 Indeed, Harvard 
graduates alone accounted for nearly one-quarter (23%) of the appear-
ances made in the past five Terms.41
This homogeneity—of both the Court and those who argue before 
it—is rarely remarked upon in media coverage. This may be because the 
lack of diversity in these spaces is expected42—even normalized.43 It may 
34. Supreme Court Bar, SCOTUS Race & Gender Statistics (last updated November 








42. The lack of diversity in American newsrooms has been documented and critiqued. 
See, e.g., 17% of Newsroom Staff Is Not White, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Nov. 5, 
2018), https://www.cjr.org/special_report/race-ethnicity-newsrooms-data.php 
[https://perma.cc/6RXL-GFAP] (“Despite being in majority-minority cities, the 
newsrooms of The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal, for instance, are both 
81 percent white. The Washington Post is 70 percent white. Minorities make up 72 
percent of the population of Los Angeles, but only 33 percent of the Los Angeles 
Times. According to the Radio Television Digital News Association, the numbers in 
other media look slightly better, if still not impressive: in 2018, about a quarter of 
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also be because those covering the Court look a lot like the Court itself.
The Supreme Court beat is very specific, requiring journalists with par-
ticular expertise—ordinarily legal training or at least some familiarity 
with the federal courts. But that criterion need not cut against diversity, 
particularly at a time when there is greater diversity in law school ma-
triculation and the legal profession more generally.44
Still, despite these changes in the profession, the ranks of the Su-
preme Court beat remain stubbornly fixed. Of the top ten daily news-
papers by circulation,45 five have a journalist dedicated to covering the 
Supreme Court and its doings. All five of these journalists are white 
men: Adam Liptak (New York Times), Robert Barnes (Washington Post), 
Jess Bravin (Wall Street Journal), David Savage (Los Angeles Times), and 
Richard Wolf (USA Today).46 To be sure, other prominent Court com-
mentators are women—such as Linda Greenhouse (New York Times), 
Dahlia Lithwick (Slate), Joan Biskupic (CNN), and Nina Totenberg 
(National Public Radio). While Greenhouse was, from 1978 to 2008, 
the New York Times’s principal journalist assigned to the Court, she has 
since retired from regular coverage and now writes a biweekly column 
staffers in TV newsrooms are people of color; in radio, it’s 11.7 percent.”); Elizabeth 
Grieco, Newsroom Employees Are Less Diverse than U.S. Workers Overall, PEW RSCH.
CTR. (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/11/02/newsroom-
employees-are-less-diverse-than-u-s-workers-overall/ [https://perma.cc/K6JV-7442] 
(“More than three-quarters (77%) of newsroom employees—those who work as re-
porters, editors, photographers and videographers in the newspaper, broadcasting and 
internet publishing industries—are non-Hispanic whites, according to the analysis of 
2012-2016 American Community Survey data.”).
43. There have been a number of recent high-profile efforts to disrupt the pervasive lack 
of diversity in journalism and media. 2020 saw the launch of The 19th, “a nonprofit,
nonpartisan newsroom reporting on gender, politics, and policy,” created in response 
to the lack of women and women’s perspectives in journalism. See THE 19TH,
https://19thnews.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/6HJX-Q5V9]. In response to journal-
ists of color, who have spoken candidly about their own experiences in homogeneous 
newsrooms, several newspapers “have announced initiatives aimed at changing their 
culture and their coverage, creating new beats, promoting people of color within and 
examining their hiring practices.” See Julie Drizin, Why Is Public Media So White?,
CURRENT (June 24, 2020), https://current.org/2020/06/why-is-public-media-so-
white/ [https://perma.cc/EV5X-RT39].
44. See Rowe, supra note 14 (discussing enrollment in law schools).
45. Top 10 U.S. Daily Newspapers, CISION MEDIA RSCH. (Jan. 4, 2019), 
https://www.cision.com/us/2019/01/top-ten-us-daily-newspapers/ [https://perma.cc
/Q74W-3GF9].
46. SCOTUS Journalists, SCOTUS Race & Gender Statistics (last updated November 
2020) (unpublished data) (on file with authors). John Fritze, also a white man, re-
placed Richard Wolf at USA Today in early 2021. See John Fritze, USA TODAY,
https://www.usatoday.com/staff/2647507001/john-fritze/ [https://perma.cc/QSL4-
JMXZ].
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on the Court.47 And while Lithwick and Totenberg are well-known and 
deeply respected for their trenchant coverage of the Court, their out-
lets—Slate and National Public Radio—may reach smaller audiences 
than the top ten newspapers.48
While Greenhouse, Lithwick, and Totenberg’s presence provides 
greater gender diversity in the Supreme Court beat, there is far less racial 
and ethnic diversity among the Court commentariat. While certainly 
not an exhaustive review, a search of Twitter profiles found several addi-
tional Supreme Court correspondents and commentators, including: 
Andrew Chung (Reuters), Ariane de Vogue (CNN), Garrett Epps (The 
Atlantic), Jessica Gresko (Associated Press), Jimmy Hoover (Law360), 
Lawrence Hurley (Reuters), John Kruzel (The Hill), Elie Mystal (The 
Nation), Kimberly Robinson (Bloomberg Law), Greg Stohr (Bloomberg 
News), and Jeffrey Toobin (CNN/formerly The New Yorker). Of these 
twelve journalists, six are white men (Epps, Hoover, Hurley, Kruzel, 
Stohr, and Toobin); three are, like Biskupic, Greenhouse, Lithwick, and 
Totenberg, white women (de Vogue, Gresko, and Robinson); one is an 
Asian man (Chung); and one is a Black man (Mystal).
When journalists seek commentary on the Court, the experts on 
whom they rely tend to be less diverse as well. The homogeneity of the 
Supreme Court clerks may exacerbate this problem, as journalists often 
solicit the input of those who have worked at the Court. But even where 
journalists turn to the legal academy for subject-matter expertise, they 
often call upon law professors who are white men.
Consider that New York Times reporter Adam Liptak cited indi-
viduals 119 times for their expertise or commentary about the Court be-
tween October 2019 and October 2020.49 Only thirty-three of those 
times (just over 25%) were the individuals cited women.50 Seven of 
those thirty-three times were citations to Professor Lee Epstein, a profes-
sor of law and political science at Washington University in St. Louis, 
47. Linda Greenhouse, 2,691 Decisions, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2008), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/13/weekinreview/13linda.html [https://perma.cc
/ZG3M-2AHT]; Linda Greenhouse, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/column
/linda-greenhouse [https://perma.cc/R8LH-G6HH].
48. Compare, e.g., Audience & Traffic, WASH. POST PR BLOG, https://www.washington
post.com/public-relations/audience-traffic/ [https://perma.cc/R4ZJ-UQME] (esti-
mating more than 111 million people visited the Washington Post in January 2021), 
with, Media Kit, SLATE, http://mediakit.slate.com/advertise/p/1 [https://perma.cc
/3AHU-Y9AM] (estimating twenty million people visit Slate per month).
49. Adam Liptak Article Scholar Citations, Oct. 2019-Oct. 2020 (last updated Novem-
ber 2020) (unpublished dataset) (on file with authors).
50. Id.
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who conducts empirical studies of the Court and its decisions.51 One of 
the thirty-three citations was to an academic article written by Justice 
Kagan.52
In this regard, the commentariat may take its cues for citing experts 
from the Court itself. Since the beginning of 2019, Justice Thomas has 
cited scholarly pieces that were authored by 128 individuals.53 Of the 
117 different named individuals he cited, eighty-eight were men—over 
75%.54 Justice Gorsuch cited pieces authored by 149 individuals, 121 of 
whom were men—over 80%.55
II. The Consequences of Homogeneity at and Around the 
Court
As we explain below, the lack of diversity on the Supreme Court 
and in the ecosystem that surrounds it likely has substantive conse-
quences for the Court’s jurisprudence; it also impacts the ways in which 
the Court’s work is translated and presented to the public.
A. Substantive Jurisprudence
Consider some of the Court’s jurisprudence related to policing: It 
is a touchstone of Fourth Amendment doctrine that a stop by police has 
occurred only if a reasonable person would not feel free to leave an en-
counter.56 Applying that standard in Florida v. Bostick, the Court con-
cluded that a reasonable person would feel free to leave when police 
boarded a bus and asked a passenger for consent to search the passen-
ger’s luggage.57 But even as a majority of the Court insisted on this vi-
sion of the Fourth Amendment, some members of the Court noted that 
it was wildly out of step with the experiences of racial minorities. In dis-
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Thomas, Data Analysis:  Thomas and Gorsuch Scholar Cites, 2018, 2019 Terms (last 
updated November 2020) (unpublished dataset) (on file with authors).
54. Id.
55. Gorsuch, Data Analysis:  Thomas and Gorsuch Scholar Cites, 2018, 2019 (last up-
dated November 2020) (unpublished dataset) (on file with authors).
56. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (“So long as a reasonable person would 
feel free ‘to disregard the police and go about his business,’ California v. Hodari D.,
499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991), the encounter is consensual and no reasonable suspicion is 
required.”).
57. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434.
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sent, Justice Thurgood Marshall, the first Black Justice and, at the time, 
the only racial minority member of the Court, observed that for the re-
spondent, a Black man, leaving the bus was hardly the most reasonable 
course of action. As Marshall explained, leaving “would have required 
respondent to squeeze past the gun-wielding [police] inquisitor who was 
blocking the aisle of the bus,” which “hardly seems like a course that 
[the respondent] would have viewed as available to him.”58 Justice Mar-
shall may have been drawing on his own experiences,59 and recent evi-
dence confirms how dangerous, and deadly, police encounters can be, 
particularly for Black men.60 Still, these insights are wholly absent from 
the majority opinion and the resulting Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence.
Utah v. Strieff similarly illustrates how considerations of race—and,
specifically, the ability of seemingly neutral rules to selectively disad-
vantage racial minorities—are absent from the Court’s criminal proce-
dure jurisprudence. In that case, the Court held that evidence obtained 
during an unlawful stop could be admitted at trial so long as the person 
stopped had an outstanding arrest warrant.61 Although the majority 
opinion scarcely acknowledged its likely impact on racial minorities, 
Justice Sotomayor, one of two racial minority members of the Court, 
did so in a vehement dissent.62 As she explained, the ruling “risk[ed] 
treating members of our communities as second-class citizens,” particu-
larly given the prevalence of outstanding warrants in communities such 
as Ferguson, Missouri, the site of major Black Lives Matter protests.63 In 
a particularly memorable passage, Justice Sotomayor, citing W.E.B. Du 
Bois, James Baldwin, and Ta-Nehisi Coates, wrote:
58. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 448 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
59. As Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has noted, all Justices “come to the Court with 
[their] own personal histories and experiences.” Sandra Day O’Connor, Thurgood 
Marshall: The Influence of a Raconteur, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1217, 1217 (1992). “At oral 
arguments and conference meetings, and in opinions and dissents” Justice Marshall, 
she observed, “imparted not only his legal acumen but also his life experiences, con-
stantly pushing and prodding us to respond not only to the persuasiveness of legal ar-
gument but also to the power of moral truth.” Id.
60. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Alexis D. Campbell, Race and Reasonableness in Police Kill-
ings, 100 B.U. L. REV. 951, 961 (2020) (“[A]cross several circumstances of police kill-
ings . . . Black suspects are more than twice as likely to be killed by police than are 
suspects from other racial or ethnic groups.”).
61. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016).
62. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2063. Justice Ginsburg joined other portions of Justice So-
tomayor’s dissent, but not this part. Justice Kagan wrote a separate dissent.
63. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2059, 2069 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); id. at 2068-69 (citing 
prevalence of outstanding warrants in New Orleans, Louisiana; Ferguson, Missouri; 
and Newark, New Jersey).
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[F]or generations, black and brown parents have given their 
children “the talk”—instructing them never to run down the 
street; always keep your hands where they can be seen; do not 
even think of talking back to a stranger—all out of fear of 
how an officer with a gun will react to them.64
The consequences of the Court’s lack of diversity are also evident 
in its reproductive rights and justice jurisprudence. In Little Sisters of the 
Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania,65 the Court held that the 
Trump administration had the statutory authority to exempt employers 
from having to notify the federal government of their objections to 
providing health insurance coverage for contraception.66 (The relevant 
employers were not churches, who enjoyed a separate exemption.) 
While the majority opinion and Justice Kagan’s concurrence focused on 
the vagaries of administrative law,67 Justice Ginsburg, in her last dissent 
on the Court, emphasized the decision’s likely impact on women 
throughout the country. As she explained, not only is contraception a 
critical aspect of women’s health care that has been shown to improve 
health outcomes, it also “improves women’s social and economic sta-
tus.”68 The Court’s decision, Ginsburg observed, would be devastat-
ing—likely resulting in “between 70,500 and 126,400 wom-
en . . . immediately los[ing] access to no-cost contraceptive services.”69
Even Justice Thomas, the Court’s staunchest conservative and for 
nearly thirty years its only Black member, has felt obliged to surface is-
sues of race and representation that have gone unnoticed or uncom-
mented upon by his colleagues. In 2003, Thomas dissented in Virginia 
v. Black, a challenge to a Virginia statute that made it a felony “for any 
person . . . with the intent of intimidating any person or group . . . to 
burn . . . a cross on the property of another, a highway or other public 
place,” and further specified that “[a]ny such burning . . . shall be prima 
facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group.”70 A plurali-
64. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2070 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
65. Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367 
(2020).
66. Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2373.
67. Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 1378-82; id. at 2397 (Kagan, J., concurring).
68. Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2402 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice So-
tomayor joined Justice Ginsburg’s dissent.
69. Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2401 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
70. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 348 (2003). In addition to his dissent, Justice 
Thomas made a rare set of interventions at the oral argument. See Linda Greenhouse, 
An Intense Attack by Justice Thomas on Cross-Burning, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2002), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/12/us/an-intense-attack-by-justice-thomas-on-
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ty of the Court concluded that the statutory presumption that cross-
burning constituted “prima facie evidence” of intent to intimidate vio-
lated the First Amendment.71 In dissent, Justice Thomas explained that 
the plurality overlooked “not only the words of the statute but also reali-
ty”—in particular, cross-burning’s long-standing use by, and association 
with, the Ku Klux Klan, “the world’s oldest, most persistent terrorist or-
ganization.”72
Taken together, these examples suggest that the Court’s homogene-
ity is not simply a question of demographics. It has substantive implica-
tions for the Court’s work. In areas of critical importance, the majority’s 
decision-making is woefully inattentive to its impact on underrepresent-
ed groups. Where these perspectives have been surfaced, it has been in 
dissenting opinions written by the Court’s few minority and women 
members.
But it is not just the limited diversity of the Court itself that im-
pacts its jurisprudence. The Court’s decisions and decision-making pro-
cesses may also suffer when the advocates who appear before the Court 
reflect an exceedingly narrow range of backgrounds and experiences.73
Former Fourth Circuit Judge J. Michael Luttig voiced this concern in a 
2014 interview with Supreme Court reporter Joan Biskupic—one of the 
few prominent women on the Supreme Court beat. Luttig observed that 
the emergence of a “narrow group of elite justices and elite counsel talk-
ing to each other” could result in both a Court and a bar that are “de-
tached and isolated from the real world, ultimately at the price of the 
healthy and proper development of the law.”74 In this regard, just as un-
derrepresented voices on the Court can surface overlooked perspectives, 
cross-burning.html [https://perma.cc/6BVP-86Q7] (quoting Justice Thomas describ-
ing a burning cross as “unlike any symbol in our society,” in that “[t]here’s no other 
purpose to the cross, no communication, no particular message,” but “to cause fear
and to terrorize a population”). For more on race and Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence 
and worldview, see Melissa Murray, Race-ing Roe: Reproductive Justice, Racial Justice, 
and the Battle for Roe v. Wade, 134 HARV. L. REV. 2025, 2068-70 (2021).
71. Black, 538 U.S. at 367(2003).
72. Black, 538 U.S. at 388 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
73. See Katherine Shaw, Friends of the Court: Evaluating the Supreme Court’s Amicus Invi-
tations, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1533, 1583 (2016) (“[A] more diverse pool of advo-
cates might bring to the Justices creative ways of approaching cases—ways they might 
not otherwise encounter, and that might ultimately enrich and even improve our 
body of law.”).
74. See Joan Biskupic, Janet Roberts & John Shiffman, The Echo Chamber, REUTERS
(Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/scotus/
[https://perma.cc/N6YC-5ZV2]; see also Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before
and Within the Supreme Court: Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar,
96 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1520-21 (2008).
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as Justices Marshall, Thomas, and Sotomayor have done in their dis-
sents, underrepresented voices before the Court can raise viewpoints that 
might otherwise go unstated in the rarefied air of One First Street.
B. Communicating Jurisprudence
Although the Court makes its decisions publicly available on its 
website and through other distribution channels, in truth, few Ameri-
cans actually read the substance of Supreme Court opinions. Instead, 
many Americans rely on media outlets—like newspapers, television, and 
podcasts—to translate the Court’s doings into lay terms. With this in
mind, the lack of diversity in the ecosystem surrounding the Supreme 
Court bar, and particularly within the commentariat that translates the 
Court’s work to the public, may have consequences for the ways in 
which the public receives and understands the Court’s decisions. The 
largely homogeneous commentariat has adopted a very particular under-
standing of what constitutes expertise about the Supreme Court—
namely, an overly formal and rigid commitment to neutrality. This con-
ception of expertise in many ways reproduces the Court’s homogeneity 
in the commentariat: By insisting that one marker of Supreme Court 
expertise is that an individual avoid strong substantive positions and 
maintain a studious commitment to neutral, “both sides” commentary, 
the norm excludes many qualified people from being considered and 
credited as Supreme Court experts.
The homogeneity among Supreme Court “experts” is partially a 
product of the ways in which we credit—and discredit—expertise. For 
some, Supreme Court expertise means the ability to recall arcane histor-
ical facts or procedural complexities divorced from the substance of a 
particular case. Treating legal trivia as a proving ground for expertise 
risks dismissing—or worse, excluding—people who don’t understand a 
reference, and it generates a contextless kind of expertise. Knowledge of 
procedural intricacies or legal arcana is certainly one kind of expertise, 
but it is not the only kind of expertise—or even the most important 
kind. Another, less valued kind of expertise is understanding the socio-
political context of an issue or the potential consequences of decisions—
such as Strieff’s consequences for heavily policed communities, or Little 
Sisters of the Poor’s consequences for women with limited job mobility. 
Also less appreciated—though no less important—is awareness of the 
racial or gender dynamics underlying a particular area of law or particu-
lar Court decision. For example, it should be a serious mark in favor of 
someone’s Supreme Court expertise if they are aware of maternal mor-
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tality rates for Black women and the history of “Mississippi appendec-
tomies.”75 Yet this kind of knowledge can be devalued as a kind of spe-
cialized expertise—a “nice-to-have” rather than a necessary predicate for 
securing status as an informed Supreme Court commentator.
Equally concerning is what gets treated as evidence of a lack of ex-
pertise. Too often, when minorities and women advert to their own 
lived experiences in dissecting legal decisions, their commentary is 
viewed as relying unduly on anecdote and narrative, as opposed to real
expertise. Similarly, holding strong views on an issue is treated as in-
compatible with genuine expertise.76 Having substantive views and hold-
ing principles does not make someone less reasonable as a lawyer or less 
equipped to comment on the Supreme Court and its work. Yet the me-
dia often seek studiously neutral experts—and commentators cultivate 
such personas, dutifully reporting the merits of “both sides” of an argu-
ment. The interest in neutral, dispassionate commentators may have 
particularly negative consequences for women, particularly women of 
color, who are often viewed as being too emotional or personally invest-
ed in their opinions.77
These norms about expertise can affect how the public understands 
the Court. In particular, they may fuel the perception that the Court is 
merely a forum for debating abstract ideas that have few consequences 
for real people’s lives—a game between competitors with equal chances 
to prevail, based only on the logic of their arguments. In fact, the Court 
is a proving ground for some of the most consequential issues of the 
75. See Lisa Ko, Unwanted Sterilization and Eugenics Programs in the United States, PBS
(Jan. 29, 2016), https://www.pbs.org/independentlens/blog/unwanted-sterilization-
and-eugenics-programs-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/82F6-KKFT] (“‘Mis-
sissippi appendectomies’ was another name for unnecessary hysterectomies performed 
at teaching hospitals in the South on women of color as practice for medical stu-
dents.”)
76. See, e.g., Thomas B. Griffith, The Degradation of Civic Charity, 134 HARV. L. REV. F. 
119, 120 (2020) (“[A]s I see it, the rot that infects our body politic comes less from 
the parade of Professor Klarman’s horribles than from the contempt that has become 
the animating spirit of much of our public discourse. On that view of things, Profes-
sor Klarman’s jeremiad is no cure for the infection that ails the heart of our democra-
cy. Indeed, the tone and manner of his complaint compound the problem.”).
77. Quentin Fottrell, ‘Women Are Judged for Being Emotional’ Yet It’s More Acceptable for 
Men to Get Upset and Angry, Female Executives Say, MARKETWATCH (Nov. 29, 
2019), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/serena-williams-got-angry-at-the-us-
open-final-and-paid-a-heavy-priceworking-women-say-this-sounds-eerily-familiar-
2018-09-10 [https://perma.cc/SH45-8TZ9]; Roxane Gay, Who Gets to Be Angry?,
N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/12/opinion/sunday
/who-gets-to-be-angry.html [https://perma.cc/T9CK-MT9U].
2021] A  P O D C A S T  O F  O N E ’S  O W N 67
day; and given its current ideological composition, some issues may be 
more hospitably received than others.
Other features of Supreme Court commentary, including how 
commentators speak about the Court’s work, may further reinforce the 
view of the Court as forum for disembodied debate. Supreme Court 
commentary sometimes has what might be called a “law bro” vibe, 
which manifests in different ways, but collectively codes in masculine
terms. Sometimes this may be nothing more than an affect or style of 
conversation—a competitive exchange in which the goal is to one up 
the other speakers rather than engage in a collective effort of clarifica-
tion or complication. It may also involve metaphors of sport or battle: 
Justices or advocates “score points,” “clash,” or “duel” while precedents 
“live to fight another day.”78 And explaining the Supreme Court 
through metaphors of competition is more in keeping with the adversar-
ial style of communication that tends to be associated with men.
Some of these dynamics may not just reflect the homogeneity in 
the Supreme Court commentariat; they may also reproduce it. Consider 
the idea that, in the interest of neutrality, a good Supreme Court com-
mentator and “true” expert will routinely find things to criticize about 
both ideological “sides” of the Court. This obligatory performance of 
even-handedness likely contributes to the homogeneity in the ranks of 
Supreme Court experts. As Justices Marshall and Sotomayor have 
acknowledged, the effects of the Court’s decisions are likely to be expe-
rienced unevenly, with members of certain communities disproportion-
ately bearing the impact. The assumption that those who are most af-
fected by the Court’s jurisprudence can view the different wings of the 
Court as equally reasonable ignores the very real impact of the Court’s 
decisions on people’s lives. As troublingly, this assumption may winnow 
out prospective members of the Supreme Court commentariat as people 
are dismissed—or, as likely, are never considered—because they are in-
78. As linguists confirm, whatever the constellation of causes, women often have different 
ways of speaking from men. Women may ask more questions, while men issue more 
directives, and women may be more likely to make statements with caveats and hu-
mility. DEBORAH TANNEN, GENDER AND DISCOURSE (1996); DEBORAH TANNEN,
YOU JUST DON’T UNDERSTAND: WOMEN AND MEN IN CONVERSATION (2007); see 
also Thomas Rogers, Why Do Men and Women Talk Differently?, SALON (Oct. 16, 
2011), https://www.salon.com/2011/10/16/why_do_men_and_women_talk
_differently/ [https://perma.cc/G27F-YF6A]; Caroline Turner, Masculine-Feminine 
Difference: How We Talk, HUFFPOST (July 16, 2014), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/caroline-turner/masculinefeminine-differe_b_
5559127.html?ncid=engmodushpmg00000004 [https://perma.cc/H44H-NCSM].
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clined toward a particular position.79 Put differently, it may be difficult 
for women and minorities to treat opinions that so acutely affect them 
and their lives as theoretical abstractions to be debated. Their inability 
to maintain a distant neutrality with regard to the Court’s decisions 
makes them less likely to be viewed as credible experts capable of “good”
Supreme Court commentary.80
The norms that pepper the rarefied atmosphere of elite legal prac-
tice also reinforce the homogeneity of the group of people considered to 
be Supreme Court experts. Consider the norms of collegiality and loyal-
ty that exist among elite lawyers. One of us has written about elite law-
yers’ unwillingness to hold their colleagues accountable for the positions 
they take, even when those positions threaten basic tenets of our consti-
tutional democracy.81 Time and again, despite having participated in ac-
tions that have been broadly condemned as deleterious to the rule of 
law, elite lawyers have been welcomed back into the fold with little 
more than a slap on the wrist for their earlier conduct. The norm of vir-
tually unconditional collegiality and loyalty operates to shelter lawyers 
from censure and public accountability for some of their worst actions. 
That norm may be unpalatable to those who think the effects of a law-
yer’s positions are relevant to assessing her merits within the professional 
community. The norm may also be unsettling to those who must live 
with the real-world consequences of a lawyer’s earlier actions.
Yet when push comes to shove, the norm of professional collegiali-
ty and loyalty operates to exclude—and disadvantage—those lawyers 
who work on behalf of the less powerful or who, because of their back-
grounds and circumstances, are not fully entrenched within elite net-
works. Consider, for example, that both Caitlin Halligan and Goodwin 
Liu are undoubtedly “elite” lawyers by any metric—they graduated 
from top law schools, clerked for the Supreme Court, and had successful 
professional careers. Yet their elite credentials were insufficient to insu-
late them from the consequences of their decisions as advocates—
79. In the case of women, especially women of color, it is more likely they will agree with 
the more liberal side of the Court. See, e.g., Alex Tyson, The 2018 Midterm Vote: Di-
visions by Race, Gender, Education, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 8, 2018), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/11/08/the-2018-midterm-vote-
divisions-by-race-gender-education/ [https://perma.cc/Q2LP-7MX8].
80. We should also note that the tenor of Supreme Court commentary can impact not 
only the views of the public, but the Justices themselves: There is evidence that the 
Justices may respond to elite cues, including those sent by members of the Supreme 
Court press corps. Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares
About Elites, Not the American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515, 1579 (2010).
81. Leah Litman, Lawyers’ Democratic Dysfunction, 68 DRAKE L. REV. 303 (2020).
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Halligan supported gun control measures, earning the ire of Second 
Amendment enthusiasts82 who organized to oppose her nomination to 
the D.C. Circuit, while Liu breached the norm of elite loyalty by testify-
ing against the confirmation of Justice Samuel Alito,83 a fact that was 
emphasized repeatedly in Liu’s failed nomination to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. By contrast, Rod Rosenstein, who re-
portedly helped to orchestrate the Trump administration’s family sepa-
ration policy,84 left the administration for a lucrative partnership with 
King & Spalding. Jay Bybee, who, as head of the Office of Legal Coun-
sel for the second Bush administration, signed the infamous Torture 
Memos, was confirmed to a seat on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit.85 While Rosenstein and Bybee, both white men, faced 
few consequences for their participation in two widely condemned gov-
ernment programs, both Halligan, a white woman, and Liu, an Asian 
American man, paid the price for their earlier decisions. In a profession 
that prides itself on collegiality and loyalty, few elite lawyers stepped up 
to expend social or professional capital to support Halligan and Liu. 
Their nominations to federal appeals courts foundered and were ulti-
mately withdrawn.86
In a similar vein, there are myriad examples of lawyers of color 
whose membership in elite networks was not enough to insulate them 
from criticism or questions about their intelligence and legal acumen. 
Throughout their careers on the Court, both Justice Thurgood Marshall 
and Justice Clarence Thomas, the only two Black jurists to serve on the 
82. Caitlin Halligan’s Record of Activism, SENATE RPC (Mar. 4, 2013), 
https://www.rpc.senate.gov/policy-papers/caitlin-halligans-record-of-activism
[https://perma.cc/MC9F-NJKD]; Gary Marx, Halligan and the Second Amendment,
NAT’L REV. (Mar. 10, 2011), https://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos
/halligan-and-second-amendment-gary-marx/ [https://perma.cc/2EYC-7VSD].
83. Wall Street Journal, Goodwin Liu: A Liberal Nominee of Illiberal Temperament, REAL 
CLEAR POL. (Apr. 17, 2010), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/2010/04/17/goodwin
_liu_a_liberal_nominee_of_illiberal_temperament_232765.html [https://perma.cc
/BHW2-6UQV].
84. Michael D. Shear, Katie Benner & Michael S. Schmidt, ‘We Need to Take Away 
Children,’ No Matter How Young, Justice Dept. Officials Said, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/06/us/politics/family-separation-border-
immigration-jeff-sessions-rod-rosenstein.html [https://perma.cc/8AW4-47MS].
85. Litman, supra note 81, at 309-10.
86. Abby Phillip, Goodwin Liu Withdraws Nomination, POLITICO (May 25, 2001), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2011/05/goodwin-liu-withdraws-nomination-
05572.4 [https://perma.cc/7727-TRC7]; Rachel Weiner, White House Withdraws 
Caitlin Halligan Nomination, WASH. POST (Mar. 22, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2013/03/22/white-house-
withdraws-caitlin-halligan-nomination/ [https://perma.cc/R9P5-KRH5].
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Court, were routinely cast as intellectual lightweights under the sway of 
more intelligent colleagues.87 Likewise, when Justice Sonia Sotomayor 
was nominated to the Supreme Court, numerous commentators public-
ly questioned her intellect88 despite the fact that she was a summa cum 
laude graduate of Princeton, received her law degree from Yale, and 
practiced for years as a prosecutor under the tutelage of long-time Man-
hattan District Attorney Robert Morgenthau.89
In some cases, advocating on behalf of underrepresented groups or 
unpopular causes can limit one’s admission to the highest rungs of the 
legal profession. As a lawyer with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, De-
bo Adegbile signed on to an appellate brief on behalf of Mumia Abu-
Jamal, an internationally-known prisoner convicted of the murder of a 
Philadelphia police officer. Years later, when Adegbile was President 
Obama’s nominee to serve as Assistant Attorney General for the Civil 
Rights Division,90 bipartisan objections to this pro bono work scuttled 
87. See Ian Millhiser, Beware: Clarence Thomas Is One of America’s Top Legal Minds,
THINKPROGRESS (Feb. 24, 2014), https://archive.thinkprogress.org/beware-clarence-
thomas-is-one-of-americas-top-legal-minds-718abf17a851/ [https://perma.cc/QG69-
QD2D] (maintaining that Justice Thomas’s silence on the bench “perpetuates a myth 
that Thomas is a lightweight, disengaged from his work and unequal to the task of 
jousting with his more intellectually gifted colleagues”); Mike Sacks, Clarence Thom-
as’ Questions, Part 3: The Myth of Scalia’s Puppet Is Quashed as Quickly as It’s Created,
HUFFPOST (Nov. 21, 2011), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/clarence-thomas-
antonin-scalia_n_1105776 [https://perma.cc/S7SC-JE4X] (noting that “[t]he most 
persistent myth about Justice Thomas” is “that he is Justice Antonin Scalia’s pup-
pet”); Juan Williams, The Many Masks of Thurgood Marshall, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 
1993), at C1 (noting that Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein’s The Brethren, a de-
piction of the Burger Court, portrayed Justice Thurgood Marshall “as a lazy man 
who spent much time watching TV and who left his court work to a series of first-
rate law clerks”).
88. Jeffrey Rosen, The Case Against Sotomayor, NEW REPUBLIC (May 3, 2009), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/60740/the-case-against-sotomayor [https://perma.cc
/38R6-4GZ4]; Debra Cassens Weiss, Laurence Tribe’s Leaked Memo: Sotomayor ‘Not 
as Smart as She Seems to Think She Is,’ A.B.A. J. (Oct. 29, 2010), 
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/laurence_tribes_leaked_memo_sotomayor
_not_as_smart_as_she_seems_to_think_sh [https://perma.cc/7DEA-7QYJ].
89. Verena Dobnik, Sotomayor Pays Tribute at Robert Morgenthau’s Funeral, AP NEWS 
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his nomination.91 Although President Obama defended his nominee’s 
record, condemning the “wildly unfair character attacks against a good 
and qualified public servant,” a majority of Senators were undeterred, 
raising the prospect of opposition from law enforcement as an impedi-
ment to Adegbile’s ability to succeed in the position.92
Adegbile’s experience was hardly exceptional. Two decades earlier, 
Senate Republicans torpedoed Lani Guinier’s nomination to the same 
position based on her “controversial writings”93 about voting rights and 
the need to increase the political power of minorities.94 Like Adegbile, 
Guinier was a product of elite legal institutions and possessed sterling 
credentials.95 As a young lawyer, she had litigated civil rights cases with 
the NAACP Legal Defense Fund.96 At the time of her nomination, she 
was a tenured professor at Harvard Law School—the first Black woman 
to achieve this distinction.97 It did not matter. In the face of opposition, 
President Bill Clinton withdrew his support for Guinier, saying that, 
upon belatedly reviewing her writing, he concluded that her views were 
“inconsistent” with his own.98
Dawn Johnsen, President Obama’s first nominee to head the Of-
fice of Legal Counsel, suffered a similar fate. Despite her extensive expe-
rience as a top executive-branch lawyer (she had already served for a pe-
riod as the acting OLC head during the Clinton administration) and a 
number of years as a distinguished law professor, her nomination was 
ultimately defeated based in part on Republican opposition to work she 
91. Meredith Clark, Obama Withdraws Nomination of Top DOJ Civil Rights Lawyer,
MSNBC (Sept. 15, 2014), https://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/obama-withdraws-
nomination-debo-adegbile-doj-civil-rights-lawyer-msna412696 [https://perma.cc
/ZHR2-38BU] (“Adegbile’s confirmation was shot down in March after senators ob-
jected to legal work he did with the NAACP’s Legal Defense Fund.”).
92. Id.
93. David Lauter, Clinton Withdraws Guinier as Nominee for Civil Rights Job: Justice 
Dept.: The President Says He Only Lately Read Her Legal Writings. He Decided She 
Stood for Principles He Could Not Support in a Divisive Confirmation Battle., L.A.
TIMES (June 4, 1993), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1993-06-04-mn-
43290-story.html [https://perma.cc/NGF8-CB5T].
94. The Destruction of Lani Guinier, CHI. TRIBUNE (June 6, 1993), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1993-06-06-9306060004-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/K2PU-V8J9].
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had done on behalf of abortion rights as a young lawyer with the ACLU 
and NARAL.99
Taken together, these episodes gesture toward a number of in-
sights. They make clear that membership in elite circles has its privileg-
es, insulating those within the group from censure or criticism of their 
professional decisions and conduct. But membership within the elite 
can be selective. Despite the right credentials and experiences, not all 
lawyers who take on contested positions or controversial causes can be 
secure in their membership within the elite. Race, gender, and class—of 
the individual and those she may champion—may distance one from 
the security and protection that elite status may provide. In this way, the 
norms of collegiality and loyalty that mark the profession also serve as 
engines to preserve and perpetuate its homogeneity.
III. Disrupting Homogeneity, One Episode at a Time
Recognizing the homogeneity in all of these aspects of the Court’s 
ecosystem, we wanted to do something to remedy these disparities—to 
highlight the voices of women and people of color, to celebrate the ex-
pertise and skill of lawyers who work on behalf of the less powerful, and 
to challenge prevailing views about what a Supreme Court expert looks 
and sounds like. Starting our podcast, Strict Scrutiny, was a small step in 
that direction. We are a podcast led by women and we wanted to create 
a space that was welcoming and inclusive to women, victims of gender-
based violence, people of color, and victims of racial discrimination and 
violence. That is the audience to whom we speak. We are not shy about 
offering our opinions. We do not aim to spend equal amounts of time 
criticizing and praising both sides of the Court. Nor do we judge our 
success based on whether all ideological sides of the Supreme Court bar 
like what we have to say.
As importantly, we want to help democratize the Supreme Court 
and the discourse surrounding it. We want more lawyers to feel empow-
ered to weigh in about the Supreme Court and to share their opinions. 
It is our hope that by sharing our views, others will feel comfortable do-
ing the same. We also hope that by helping to keep the public up to 
date on the Court’s work, we make it easier to stay abreast of an im-
99. Charlie Savage, Obama Nominee to Legal Office Withdraws, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9,
2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/10/us/politics/10johnsen.html 
[https://perma.cc/REV6-P7ZH]; Carrie Johnson, Dawn Johnsen: ‘I Have No Regrets,’
NPR (June 25, 2020), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=
128099976 [https://perma.cc/HL4G-FK5Y].
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portant institution in our system of government—one whose output 
can often feel impenetrable and inaccessible.
On the whole, it has been an incredibly rewarding experience. We 
have delighted in each other’s company and in the community that we 
have created with our listeners. It has been incredibly rewarding to hear 
from law students, particularly women law students, law students of 
color, and first generation law students, who tell us how much they en-
joy the podcast and what it means to them to hear their perspectives 
surfaced in discussions of the Court and legal culture. And we have had 
more than a few laughs at ourselves, with each other, and (of course) at 
the Court, too.
And that’s part of the point: We want to change the sound of Su-
preme Court expertise. Commentary and expertise can be fun and fun-
ny, rather that studiously abstract and stiflingly neutral. On the show, 
we talk about pop culture in addition to the Supreme Court and try to 
push back on some of the “male-ness” of Supreme Court commentary.
As with any endeavor, there have been challenges. One of us is un-
tenured, prompting occasional questions about how she is spending her 
time. There are the occasional internet haters who explain—in detail—
all the things we have done wrong and could do better. It is never fun to 
be on the receiving end of missives questioning your competence to 
opine on matters of actual technical expertise or difficulty. Nor is it easy 
to read reviews about your “ranting” and “unreflective[] bias[].” There 
are also the expected comments about how our “voice and cadence are 
very difficult to listen to.” Some people don’t even like Leah’s Voting 
Rights Act jokes. (Sorry; she’s not sorry.)
But the challenges are clearly outweighed by the rewards. In just 
two years, we have been able to draw greater attention to issues that 
matter to us and to many of our listeners. We have celebrated stellar ad-
vocates while urging the Court to take greater steps to expand the ranks 
of its bar. We have highlighted cases—both those that garner outsized 
attention and those that pass with little fanfare—and dissected deci-
sions. And in doing all of this, we have tried at every turn to underscore 
the many ways in which the Court’s work impacts so much of our lives.
Conclusion
It is tempting to think that the diversity of the federal courts, the 
Supreme Court, the Supreme Court bar, and the Supreme Court com-
mentariat will improve over time, as changing demographics at law 
schools result in a more diverse pool of attorneys. But it would be a mis-
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take to think that result is inevitable—that is, that diversity in the Su-
preme Court ecosystem will follow naturally from diversity in law 
schools. Law schools have been admitting and graduating women in 
equal numbers to men for decades, and they have been committed to 
admitting and graduating people of color. And yet that has failed to re-
sult in women and people of color breaking into the Supreme Court 
ecosystem in substantial numbers. Instead, what has happened is some 
small gains, followed by regression and stasis.
If we want a Supreme Court ecosystem that tracks the trajectory of 
the academy and the legal profession, we have to be open to rethinking 
the norms, rules, and cultural practices that together create and sustain 
that ecosystem.
